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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

by the secured creditor in In re Clark
Pipe & Supply Co., an unusual case
in which a panel of the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit first
ruled against the secured creditor
A creditor with a perfected secu- on both the preference and equitable
rity interest in collateral usually subordination issues, 1 but later
rests easily knowing that its secured withdrew that decision and reversed
status will result in eventual pay- itself in response to a request for a
ment if the debtor subsequently files motion for a rehearing en bane. 2
a bankruptcy petition. This tranquilClark Pipe & Supply Company
ity often disappears, however, when (Clark) was in the business of buythe collateral consists of inventory ing and selling steel pipe used in
or accounts receivable and a trustee the fabrication of offshore drilling
or debtor in possession commences platforms. In September 1980, Asan adversary proceeding seeking to sociates Commercial Corporation
recover preferences based on an im- (Associates) and Clark executed
provement of the secured creditor's various agreements under which
position vis~a -vis other creditors Associates would make revolving
within the ninety-day period prior loans secured by a security interest
to bankruptcy. Add to the complaint in accounts receivable and invena second cause of action seeking tory. The agreements required
equitable subordination of the se- Clark to deposit all collections from
cured claim based on the secured accounts receivable in a bank accreditor's control of the debtor's count belonging to Associates. As
operations, and the secured credi- is typical in such fmancing arrangetor's problems are magnified.
ments, the amount Associates
Such challenges were defended would lend was determined by a
formula: Associates would advance
"' Special Counsel to the law firm of a percentage of the amount of eligiKaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler,
N.Y. C. Member of the National Bankruptcy ble accounts receivable plus a perConference.
centage of the cost of inventory.
"'"'Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished Associates reserved the right in its
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra UniTHE APPLICATION OF
IMPROVEMENT OF POSITION AND
EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION
DOCTRINES: CLARK PIPE
RECONSIDERED

versity School of Law, Hempstead, N. Y.C.
Counsel to the law firm of Fried, Frank,
Harris, Shriver&Jacobson, N.Y.C.
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FROM THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS

discretion to reduce these percentages at any time.
"When bad times hit the oil field
in late 1981, Clark's business
slumped,' ' 3 and, as a result, in early
1982, Associates began reducing
the percentage advance rates so that
Clark would have just enough cash
to pay its direct operating expenses,
keep the business going, and sell
inventory. The proceeds were used
to pay off past advances made by
Associates, although the court of
appeals observed that Associates
"did not expressly dictate to Clark
which bills to pay. Neither did it
direct Clark not to pay vendors or
threaten Clark with a cut-off of advances if it did pay vendors. " 4
Nonetheless, the new advances did
not leave Clark with enough money
to pay vendors or others whose services were not essential for continuation of the business.
After several unpaid vendors
commenced foreclosure proceedings based on vendors' liens, Clark
sought protection under chapter 11.
The case was converted to chapter
7 soon thereafter. The relationship
between Clark and Associates led
the trustee in bankruptcy to institute
an adversary proceeding that sought
the recovery of preferences from
Associates and equitable subordination of its claim. Following a trial,
the bankruptcy court entered judgment against Associates in the sum
of $370,505, representing payments found to be preferential, and
3
4

/d., 893 F.2d at 695.
/d.

subordinated Associates' claim.
The district court and the court of
appeals originally affirmed, but
then the court of appeals substituted
a different opinion, reversing and
remanding.
The first issue before the court of
appeals was whether the bankruptcy
court was correct in finding that
Clark, by selling its inventory and
then turning over the realized accounts receivable that had previously been assigned to Associates,
made a preferential transfer to Associates avoidable under Sections
547(b) and 547(c){5) of the Bankruptcy Code. 5 "Under section
547(c)(5), a voidable preferential
transfer occurred if Associates improved its position over the ninetys Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code,
II U.S.C. § 547(b), contains five elements
of an avoidable preference. Section 547(c)
contains a list of the exceptions to§ 547(b).
Section 547(c)(5).provides:
The trustee may not avoid under this
section a transfer- ... (5) that creates a
perfected security interest in inventory
or a receivable or the proceeds of either,
except to the extent that the aggregate of
all such transfers to the transferee caused
a reduction, as of the date·ofthe filing of
the petition and to the prejudice of other
creditors holding unsecured claims, of
any amount by which the debt secured
by such security interest exceeded the
value of all security interests for such
debt on the later of
(A)(i) with respect to a transfer to which
subsection (b)(4)(A) of this section applies, 90 days before the date of the filing
of the petition; or
(ii) with respect to a transfer to which
subsection (b)(4)(B) of this section applies, one year before the date of the
filing of the petition; or
(B) the date on which new value was
first given under the security agreement
creating such security interest.
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day period between February 7 and
May 7 to the prejudice of unsecured
creditors. '' 6
It is important to understand at
the outset why a floating lien in
inventory or accounts receivable
may be vulnerable to preference attack under Section 547(b), despite
the fact that the loan, security agreement, and filing of a financing statement have all occurred long before
the ninety-day preference period. If
a secured creditor has a lien on
inventory which generally ''turns
over'' every thirty or sixty days,
it follows that all of the inventory
owned by the debtor on the date of
bankruptcy will be new inventory
purchased within the preference period. Add Section 547(e)(3), which
provides that a transfer for preference purposes does not occur until
the debtor has rights in the collateral, and the result is that the' 'transfer'' of the security interest regarding all the existing inventory took
place within ninety days of bankruptcy, and, since the debt was incurred long ago, the transfer is one
that secures an antecedent debt.
6
See note 3 supra, 893 F.2d at 696,
where the court observed that Associates
did not raise the issue of whether Clark's
liquidation of inventory and receivables and
payment of proceeds to Associates worked
to prejudice unsecured creditors. The court
noted that the parties may have assumed that
prejudice to the claims of vendors may have
satisfied this requirement: •'In any event we
do not reach that issue here. We only note,
however, that improvement in position,
standing alone, does not establish a preferential transfer-the transfer must be 'to the
prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims.' ''

[Vol. 23 : 198 1990]

It is easy to see how the effect of
Section 547(e)(3), standing alone,
would wipe out the benefits of having a perfected lien in inventory
or accounts receivable. However,
Section 547(c)(5) at least partially
rescues the secured creditor by insulating the floating lien from preference attack to the extent that the
secured creditor's position did not
improve during the ninety -day period at the expense of other creditors.
In order to determine whether Associates improved its position during the ninety-day preference period, the court applied the Section
547(c)(5) two-part test it had explained in In re Missionary Baptist
Foundation of America, Inc. 7 In essence, this test requires a computation of ( 1) the loan balance outstanding ninety days prior to bankruptcy;
(2) the value of the collateral on that
day; (3) the loan balance outstanding on the day the bankruptcy petition was filed; and (4) the value of
the collateral on that day.
A determination could be made
as to whether Associates improved
its position by a comparison of the
loan balance minus the value of Associates' collateral on February 5
with the loan balance minus the
value of Associates' collateral on
May 7. Since the loan balances were
not in dispute, the task facing the
court was a determination of the
value of the collateral.
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Going Concern vs. Liquidation
Value

the ninety-day period from February 5 to May 7. This fmding of fact
was not clearly erroneous. Therefore, for the purpose of determining
whether Associates improved its position at the expense of other creditors during the ninety-day period,
the court of appeals held that the
liquidation method of valuing the
collateral was appropriate at both
ends of the preference period.
The court's use of the liquidation
method was consistent with the
opinion of authorities in the field.
Two commentators, in an article
on valuation in bankruptcy, have
noted:

Resolution of the question of
whether the secured creditor improved its position will often depend
on the method of valuation used.
Since the Bankruptcy Code offers
no definition of value, the courts
have been left to determine its meaning on a case-by-case basis. 8 Associates argued that the bankruptcy
court should have employed the
"going concern" method of valuation rather than the "liquidation"
method. Examining the record to
determine whether the bankruptcy
court adopted the appropriate
method of valuing the inventory,
the court stated:

If an asset is not used as part of a
business, or if the business is not
viable, the asset is valued at how
much it will bring at a sale less the
costs of disposition-a ''liquidation
value." Liquidation values assume
no future or a limited future for an
asset's relationship to a concern. The
liquidation value of an asset will depend on how much time is available
for its disposition, who is selling it,
and how and where it is sold. 10

The Code does not prescribe any
particular method of valuing collateral, but instead leaves valuation
questions to judges on a case-by-case
basis . . . . Valuation is a mixed
question of law and fact, the factual
premises being subject to review on
a "clearly erroneous" standard, and
the legal conclusions being subject to
de novo review . . . .9

The bankruptcy court had accepted the testimony of the trustee's
expert that the debtor was in the
process of liquidation throughout
8
See 4 Collier on Bankrutpcy (15th ed.
1989) , 547.13 at 547-556: "The Code
offers no guidance to determining the value
to be used in calculating a creditor's improvement in position. In a liquidation case
under chapter 7 it would seem that a liquidation value should be used, although other
valuation standards may be appropriate under certain circumstances.''
9
Note 2 supra, 893 F .2d at 697.

Debtor's Perspective vs. Secured
Creditor's Perspective
Associates also argued that assuming that the liquidation method
was appropriate, the bankruptcy
court improperly viewed the value
of inventory from the debtor's perspective rather than the creditor's
perspective. Associates complained
that the bankruptcy court erred
1
° Fortgang & Mayer, "Valuation in
Bankruptcy," 32 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1061,
1064 (1985).
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when it subtracted out the debtor's
operating costs that bore no relation
to the liquidation of inventory. In
other words, the value of the inventory to the secured creditor is the
only significant factor in applying
the improvement of position test;
any cost or benefit to the estate of
the continued use of the inventory
is not important.
The court of appeals agreed with
Associates' position that the bankruptcy court improperly valued the
collateral from the debtor's perspective:
The ''ultimate goal'' of the improvement in position test is ''to determine
whether the secured creditor is in a
better position than it would have
been had bankruptcy been declared
ninety days earlier . . . . Cases that
have addressed the valuation of inventory in the ''improvement in position'' test have repeatedly focused on
value in the hands of the creditor. 11

Once the court concluded that the
bankruptcy court erred in focusing
on the value of the inventory in the
hands of the debtor instead of on the
value in the hands of the secured
creditor, the question of whether the
bankruptcy court erred in deducting
Clark's expenses that were unrelated to the cost of liquidation had
become moot. The court emphasized, however, that, on remand,
the only costs to be considered and
deducted in determining the value
of the inventory were those that
would be incurred if a seizure and

sale of the inventory by Associates
had taken place.
The court of appeals also cautioned the bankruptcy court to consider "the specific economic realities surrounding a transfer' ' when
valuing either inventory or accounts
receivable. 12 In this connection, the
bankruptcy court was criticized for
valuing the collateral at 60 percent
below cost. Even if the bankruptcy
court was correct in valuing the collateral from the debtor's vantage
point, it ignored economic realities
in reaching its conclusidn in the fact
of credible evidence showing that,
during the ninety-day preference
period, (1) there was stability in
the pipe market; (2) the fair market
value of pipe was approximately
100 percent of cost; (3) the debtor
actually liquidated inventory at 93
percent to 123 percent of cost; and
(4) pipe vendors were willing to
give credit for returned pipe at or
near 100 percent of cost.
In remanding the matter on the
valuation issue, the court of appeals
suggested that the bankruptcy court
might wish to consider upon request
of either party whether an unexercised vendor's privilege, which under Louisiana law may prime the
security interest, should be considered in valuing inventory from the
perspective of Associates. 13 The
court of appeals expressed no views
on the possible answer. Whether the
vendor holding a lien that had not
been exercised lost its priority is an
12

11

[Vol. 23: 1981990]

13

Note 2 supra, 893 F.2d at 698.
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pronged test to determine whether
and to what extent a claim should
be equitably subordinated: (1) the
claimant must have engaged in some
type of inequitable conduct, (2) the
misconduct must have resulted in injury to the creditors of the bankrupt
or conferred an unfair advantage on
the claimant, and (3) equitable subordination of the claim must not be
inconsistent with the provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code. 15

issue under Louisiana law that the
court left for another day, but the
effect of such loss would increase
the value of the property when sold.
Equitable Subordination
The trustee had another arrow
for his bow: a cause of action for
equitable subordination under Section 510(c) of the Code. 14 Subordination would reclassify Associates'
claim to the extent that its lien would
be transferred to the estate and Associates would receive no dividend
until general creditors were fully
·paid. A mere recovery of a preference without equitable subordination would not be as devastating to
the secured creditor in that it would
still leave Associates' with an unsecured claim deserving of equal
treatment with other unsecured
claims.
At the outset of its discussion in
its second opinion on the issue, the
court of appeals set forth the test
for determining whether equitable
subordination was justified:
This court has enunciated a three14

11 U.S.C. § 5IO(c)provides:
Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b)
of this section, after notice and a hearing,
the court may(1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of
distribution all or part of an allowed
claim to all or part of another allowed
claim ... ; or
(2) order that any lien securing such a
subordinated claim be transferred to
the estate.
See generally, B. Weintraub & A. Resnick, Bankruptcy Law Manual, , 5.15 (rev.
ed. 1986).

Regarding the first prong of
the test-inequitable conduct-the
court noted that three general categories of conduct have been recognized as sufficient to satisfy this
prong: ( 1) fraud, illegality or breach
of fiduciary duties; (2) undercapitalization; and (3) a claimant's use of
the debtor as a mere instrumentality
or alter ego.
The bankruptcy court held that
under the facts of the case, Associates' conduct warranted equitable
subordination. The bankruptcy
court found that, having realized
Clark's desperate fmancial condition, Associates asserted ''total control'' over Clark and used Clark as
a ''mere instrumentality to liquidate
Associates' unpaid loans" to the
detriment of other creditors. 16 At
first, the court of appeals agreed
with that finding and affirmed the
subordination of Associates' claim.
However, on reconsideration, the
court of appeals reversed itself and
15
Note 2 supra, 893 F.2d at 699. The
court cited its decision in In re Missionary
Baptist Foundation of Am., 71 F.2d 206,
212 (5th Cir. 1983).
16
Note 2 supra, 893 F .2d at 699.
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held that such subordination was not
warranted under the facts of the
case. The court of appeals stated:
Upon reconsideration, we have concluded that we cannot say that the
sort of control Associates asserted
over Clark's financial affairs rises to
the level of unconscionable conduct
necessary to justify the application of
the doctrine of equitable subordinationY

The "salient fact" that was the
primary cause of the court's withdrawal of its prior decision was that,
pursuant to the loan agreement between the parties, Associates had
the right to reduce funding as
Clark's sales slowed and all that it
did was to exercise that right. There
was no evidence that Associates exceeded its authority under the loan
agreement nor that Associates acted
inequitably. Furthermore, the
agreement was negotiated at arm's
length between the parties almost
two years before bankruptcy, while
their relationship was just beginning
and while Clark was solvent. Clark
was represented by an attorney, and
the agreements were typical of the
documents used in similar assetbased financing.
The loan agreemeqt established a
line of credit equal to 85 percent
of the amount of eligible accounts
receivable plus 60 percent of the
cost of inventory. Clark was required to deposit all collections
from the accounts receivable in a
bank account belonging to Associ17

/d.

[Vol. 23: 1981990]

ates, and Associates would then readvance the agreed-upon portion of
those funds to Clark on a revolving
basis. The agreement gave Associates the right to reduce the percentage advance rates at any time in its
discretion.
With the decline in Clark's business, Associates reduced the advance ratio for the inventory loan
by 5 percent per month beginning
in January 1982. The company
stopped buying new inventory after
that time. Despite Associates' motive to obtain as much money for
itself prior to the filing of the petition, the amount of new advances
continued to be based on the applicable funding formulas.
The court of appeals noted that in
its original opinion, it failed to focus
sufficiently on the loan agreement
that gave Associates the right to
conduct its affairs with Clark in the
manner in which it did, and was
influenced by the "negative and inculpatory tone of [Associates' former loan officer's] testimony.
Given the agreement he was working under, his testimony was hardly
more than fanfaronading about the
power that the agreement afforded
him over the fmancial affairs of
Clark. " 18 On reconsideration, the
court of appeals concluded that the
record did not reveal any conduct
on Associates' part that was inconsistent with the loan agreement:
18
/d. at 701. Associates' former loan
officer testified that Associates' motive was
''to get in the best possible position I can
prior to the bankruptcy, i.e., I want to get
the absolute amount of dollars as low as I
can by hook or crook." /d. at 700.

204

FROM THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS

Through its loan agreement, every
lender effectively exercises "control" over its borrowers to some degree. A lender in Associates' position
will usually possess "control" in the
sense that it can foreclose or drastically reduce the debtor's fmancing.
The purpose of equitable subordination is to distinguish between the unilateral remedies that a creditor may
properly enforce pursuant to its
agreements with the debtor and other
inequitable conduct such as fraud,
misrepresentation, or the exercise of
such total control over the debtor
as to have essentially replaced its
decision-making capacity with that
of th~ lender. The crucial distinction
between what is inequitable and what
a lender can reasonably and legitimately do to protect its interests is
the distinction between the existence
of ''control'' and the exercise of that
"control" to direct the activities of
the debtor. 19

The court distinguished Associates' conduct from that of the creditor in In re American Lumber Co. ,20
a decision in which the claim of a
bank was equitably subordinated.
The court of appeals commented
that ''the facts of that case are significantly more egregious than we have
here.' ' 21 In American Lumber, the
bank ''controlled'' the debtor
through its controlling interest in the
debtor's stock. The bank exercised
control over all aspects of the company's fmances and operations. Despite the bank's decision to prohibit
further advances to the company

and to use all available funds of the
company to offset the company's
obligations to the bank, the bank
made two misrepresentations to a
credit association when it assured
the association that the debtor was
not in a bankruptcy situation and
that current contracts would be fulfllled. Only two days later, the bank
gave notice of foreclosure of its
security interests in the inventory
and equipment, which were sold
shortly thereafter, and the bank applied all of the proceeds to the bank
·
debt.
In contrast to American Lumber,
the court of appeals indicated that
Associates held no stock in the
debtor, made no management decisions, did not place any of its employees as officers or directors of
Clark, never influenced the removal
of employees from office, nor requested Clark to take any particular
action at a shareholders' meeting.
Associates did not expressly dictate
to Clark which bills to pay, nor did
it direct Clark not to pay vendors or
threaten a cutoff in advances if it
did pay vendors. Clark handled its
own daily operations and, during
the ninety-day period, did not
change its basic procedures regarding reporting of collateral, calculation of availability of funds, and
advancement of funds.
Unlike the lender in American Lum-

ber, Associates did not mislead creditors to continue supplying Clark .. .
[and] perhaps most important .. .
Associates did not coerce Clark into

19
ld. at 701.
:zo 5 Bankr. 470 (D. Minn. 1980).
21
Note 2 supra, 893 F.2d at 701.
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executing the security agreements
after Clark became insolvent . . . .22

The court concluded that Associates did not engage in inequitable
conduct. The earlier opinion of the
court assumed that Associates knew
that Clark was selling pipe to which
suppliers had a first lien, but, in its
second opinion, the court recognized that that priority issue was not
decided by the court until a later
date. Although the trustee made
much of the point that Associates
encouraged Clark to remove decals
from the pipes in its inventory, the
court's reexamination of the record
reveals that it did not support such
finding. The court also found that
the record was devoid of evidence
that Associates misled creditors to
their detriment.
Having held that equitable subordination was inapplicable in the
case, the court of appeals opted to
avoid addressing the question
whether avoiding the transfer and
equitable subordination are duplicative or complementary remedies. 23
Conclusion
The Clark Pipe case demonstrates
the complexity of resolving valuation issues in bankruptcy proceedings. The facts reveal a paradox of
the valuation syndrome, where the
debtor was open for business as a
going concern while at the same
time liquidating its inventory. The
court's use of liquidation value was
correct, especially in view of its
22
23

/d. at 702.
/d. at 695.

[Vol. 23: 1981990]

decision to measure value from
the secured creditor's standpoint.
Clearly, in the hands of the secured
creditor, the inventory would have
been liquidated. We also are confident that the court's decision to view
the improvement of position test
from the creditor's vantage point
was correct. From the secured creditor's perspective, the inventory
usually would have brought less if
it had seized and sold the inventory
at a foreclosure sale and deducted
the costs of seizure and sale.
Secured creditors should take
comfort in the court's discussion of
equitable subordination. The first
opinion of the court had the secured
creditor worrying about whether it
had the right to U;Se procedures and
remedies clearly provided for in
loan documents negotiated at arm's
length and in accordance with typical commercial practice. The second opinion correctly distinguished
between, on the one hand, exercising too much control over the internal operations of the debtor coupled
with deceptive practices and, on the
other hand, relying on aggressive
but traditional secured creditor remedies found in garden variety assetbased lending agreements.
Since the court of appeals held
that equitable subordination was not
applicable to the case, it did not
address the question of whether
avoiding the transfer as a preference
and equitable subordination are duplicative or complementary remedies. There is nothing in Section
51 0(c) which indicates that it is du-
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plicative of Section 547 on preferences. Equitable subordination of
claims is a concept that may be

applied independently and in addition to remedies provided under
Section 547.
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